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The plaintiffs/appellants, The Travel Company and William
Hatton, pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, submit the following Appellants1 Brief.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j ).

This is an appeal from the Order and

Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. That
Order and Final Judgment granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
1.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

concluding

that

the

plaintiffs' claims are barred by the two-year corporate survival
statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989)?
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the two-year

corporate survival statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989), and
not the six-year statute of limitations on written contracts of
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2), applies to the plaintiffs' claims?
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the two-year

corporate survival statute is absolute and not subject to extension
under the circumstances of this case?
4.

Did the trial court err in concluding that William Hatton

has no individual claim under the terms of the Agreement and
Promissory Note?
1

5.

Is William Hatton entitled to pursue an individual claim

under the terms of the Agreement and Promissory Note because the
assets of the Travel Company passed to him on dissolution of the
corporation?
6.

Is William Hatton entitled to pursue his individual claim

as a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement and Promissory Note?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All issues on appeal involve legal conclusions by the trial
court.

These legal conclusions will be given no deference by the

Utah Supreme Court and will be reviewed for legal correctness. Alf
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is
determinative of certain issues on appeal.
governed by case law authority.

Other issues are

The language of these designated

statutes is set out in the Addendum to this Appellants' Brief
pursuant to Rule 24(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989);
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2);
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a claim for breach of contract and an accounting

regarding a purchase agreement and promissory note executed between

2

the plaintiffs and the defendants.

In 1979, William Hatton and

Wanda Hatton ("Hattons11) founded a travel service business known as
The Travel Company.

In December of 1984, Morris Travel and its

guarantors began negotiations to purchase the stock and assets of
The Travel Company

from the Hattons.

In April of 1985, an

agreement was reached between the parties for the purchase by
Morris Travel of the assets of The Travel Company.

The terms of

the sale were incorporated into an agreement entitled Agreement for
the Purchase and Sale of Assets ("Purchase Agreement") dated April
15, 1985.

A copy of that Purchase Agreement is included in the

Addendum to this Appellants1 Brief.

This is an action for breach

of that Purchase Agreement.
B.

Course of Proceedings
The plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Jury Demand in this

case on February 18, 1993. (R.2-56).

The action was filed by the

Travel Company and William Hatton "individually and on behalf of
The Travel Company."

(R.2).

On or about March 17, 1993, the defendants filed their Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (R.63-65),
alleging that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 (1989), the
plaintiffs could not assert claims on behalf of a corporation which
was dissolved more than five years before this action was filed.
That motion was supported by a memorandum of law. (R.66-107).
The plaintiffs

filed

a Memorandum

in Opposition

to the

Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary
3

Judgment.

The plaintiffs argued that (1) The Travel Company had

complied with the applicable six-year statute of limitations of
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2);
survival

statute

of

(2) that the two-year

limitations

is

not

absolute

corporate
and

that

circumstances of this case dictate that the two-year limitation be
extended; (3) that even if the two-year statute applies, William
Hattonfs

individual

contractual

privity

claims
with

are
the

not

precluded,

defendants,

based

his

on

status

his

as

a

shareholder of The Travel Company, and his status as a third-party
beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement. (R.118-142).
After hearing, the Trial Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, concluding

that

(1) all

obligations

allegedly owed by Morris Travel were corporate claims of The Travel
Company and that William Hatton had no individual claim concerning
those obligations; (2) William Hattonfs individual claims as a
shareholder, whether asserted by Hatton or The Travel Company, are
governed by the two-year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100
and that those claims are barred as untimely; (3) and that the
Courtf s

conclusions

regarding

the

corporate

nature

of

the

obligation is supported by the initial complaint filed by The
Travel

Company,

the

documents

filed

in the

Hattonfs

divorce

proceedings, and the substantive allegations of the plaintiffs'
complaint in this case. (R.254-256).
This appeal followed. (R.257-258).

4

C.

Statement of Facts
1.

The Travel Company is a former Utah corporation with its

principal place of business located in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

William Hatton is an individual and former President of the

Travel Company. (R. 2)
2.
Express

On April 15, 1985, the Travel Company, Morris Travel
Corporation,

then known

as Morris

Travel

Corporation

("Morris Travel"); and William and Wanda Hatton entered into an
Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of the Travel Companyfs assets.
("Purchase Agreement"). (R. 3-4; 118).
To William Hatton1s knowledge, the Agreement and Exhibits

3.

were drafted by lawyers for Morris Travel.
additions,
document.
4.

or alterations

were

made

Only minor changes,

by the Hattons

to that

(R. 143-144).
The Travel Company, Morris Travel, and William and Wanda

Hatton were specifically designated as separate parties to the
Purchase Agreement (The Travel Company designated "Seller", Morris
Travel designated "Buyer", and William and Wanda Hatton designated
"Hattons"). (R. 119, 133).
5.

The Purchase Agreement was signed seperately by the

Travel Company by its president; Morris Travel by its president;
and William Hatton and Wanda Hatton as individuals.

5

(R. 119, 133).

6.

Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, Morris

Travel paid The Travel Company a specified amount at the time of
closing and executed a Promissory Note for the balance.

(R. 4,

177-178)•
7.

The Promissory Note was specifically incorporated as

part of the Purchase Agreement executed between The Travel Company,
Morris Travel, and the Hattons on April 15, 1985.
8.

(R. 137).

Kay H. Burgon, Randall A. Hunt, Richard Frendt and Mark

G. Slack executed Guaranty Agreements in conjunction with the
execution of the Promissory Note to guaranty payment of the Note.
(R. 9, 15-17, 140).
9.

In paragraph 1 of the Purchase Agreement, the plaintiffs

transferred to Morris Travel the following:
(a) The name "The Travel Company" and all
variations and derivations thereof and all goodwill
associated therewith, as such names are now or formally
have been used by Seller in connection with Seller ? s
business operations in the State of Utah or any other
SLuLc.

• • •

(h) Any other assets, including without limitation
and other leases or contracts used by Seller in
connection with its business . . .
(R. 176-177).
10.

Paragraph 19(b) of the Agreement provides as follows:

All of the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon
and inure to the benefit of, and Shall be enforceable by
the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal
representatives and assigns of Buyer, Seller, and the
Hattons. (Emphasis added).
(R. 203).

6

11.

Under the terms of a Hatton divorce agreement, William

Hatton has been given authority to pursue this claim against Morris
Travel for both himself and Wanda Hatton.
12.

On October 1, 1987, the Department of Commerce for the

State of Utah involuntarily

dissolved

failure to file an annual report.
13.

(R. 136).

In

February

of

1988,

The Travel Company for

(R. 74).
Morris

made

payment

to

the

plaintiffs to cover installments due under the Promissory Note on
April 30, 1987; July 31; 1987; October 31, 1987 and January 31,
1988.

(R. 10).

The next installment was due on April 30, 1988.

(R. 137).
14.

After the April 1988 installment was not made, on or

about June 30, 1988, The Travel Company, through prior counsel,
filed a lawsuit in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah to collect moneys owed under the Purchase Agreement
and Promissory Note.
15.

(R. 75-96).

During negotiations, counsel for Morris Travel required

that payments made under the Promissory Note be approved by William
Hatton and Wanda Hatton.
16.

(R. 141-142).

On August 3, 1988, The Travel Company, through prior

counsel, filed a Notice of Dismissal without prejudice of that
action pursuant
Procedure.

to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil

(R. 106-107).
7

17.

That dismissal was not filed in response to any payment

made to the Travel Company or the Hattons by Morris Travel, and was
not intended as a resolution of this claim.
of

Hatton?s

prior

counsel's

conflict

It was filed because
of

interest,

represented one of the Hattons in divorce proceedings.

having
(R. 143-

144).
18.

On February 18, 1993, this action was brought by The

Travel Company and William Hatton against Morris Travel and the
individual guarantors to collect moneys owed under the Agreement
and Promissory Note.
19.

(R. 2-56).

After the filing of this action, the defendants moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the two-year corporate survival statute of Utah Code Ann.
§16-10-100.
20.

(R. 63-65)

The plaintiffs responded to the defendants1 motion for

summary judgment arguing that the six-year statute of limitations
of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2), not the two-year corporate survival
statute, applies to these claims of breach of a written contract;
that even if the two-year corporate survival statute applies, that
limitation

is

not

absolute

and

may

be

extended

under

the

circumstances of this case; that the two-year corporate survival
statute bars only The Travel Company claims, and not the individual
claims of William Hatton, which claims he is entitled to pursue
8

either as an individual party, or a third-party beneficiary, to the
Agreement and Promissory Note.
21.

(R. 118-142).

After hearing and oral argument, the trial court granted

the defendants the Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the
plaintiffs1 claims were barred by Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100(1989).
(R. 254-256).
22.

This appeal followed.

(R. 257-258).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The

trial

court

erred

in

concluding

that

the

two-year

corporate dissolution statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 governs
this case.

The applicable statute of limitations is the six-year

limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) dealing with actions on
written instruments.

Even if the two-year limitation period

applies, that limitation period is not absolute. The facts of this
case and equity support the extension of that limitation period.
The plaintiffs' claims are in the nature of "winding up" the
affairs of The Travel Company.
dissolution

statute

are

not

The purposes of the corporate

violated

by

allowing

The

Travel

Company's claims to proceed.
Even if The Travel Company's claims are barred by the two-year
corporate dissolution statute, William Hatton is entitled to pursue
his individual claims against the defendants.

Hatton is a named

party to the Purchase Agreement and is in direct contractual
privity with the defendants.

The Prommisory Note is incorporated
9

as part of the Purchase Agreement.

Hatton is also entitled to

pursue this individual claim because the assets of The Travel
Company passed to him on dissolution of the corporation.
Hatton is a third-party creditor beneficiary
Agreement

and

Promissory

Note,

entitling

Finally,

of the Purchase

his

to

pursue

his

individual claims.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRAVEL COMPANY HAS COMPLIED WITH THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANN., §78-12-23(2)
The defendants claim that the plaintiffs1 claims are barred by
the

two-year

limitation

of Utah

Code

Ann.

§16-10-100.

The

plaintiffs argue that the complaint in this case was timely filed
within the six-year limitation for claims on written contracts
under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2).

There can be no dispute that if

the six-year statute of limitations applies, the plaintiff's claims
are timely filed.

The question is which limitation applies.

The defense of statute of limitations is not favored by the
courts.

Woodward v. Chirco Construction, Inc., 141 Ariz. 520, 687

P.2d 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).

If two statutes of limitations

may apply to a claim, the longer statute is preferred.
by

the

Alaska

Supreme

Court

in

Safeco

Insurance

Honeywell, Inc., 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 1981):

10

As stated
Company

v.

The statute of limitations is not such a meritorious
defense that either the law or the facts should be
strained in aid of it. (Citation omitted). Statutes
prescribing a relatively short period of time for
allowing actions are usually construed narrowly to the
extent necessary to give the holder of a cause of action
a fair opportunity to present his claim.
Where two
constructions to the limitations are possible, the
Court? s prefer the one which gives the longer period in
which to prosecute the action.
Appellate courts consistently hold that where two statutes of
limitations may govern a case, the longer statute of limitations is
preferred.

Theil v. Taurus Drilling, Ltd., 710 P.2d 33 (Mont.

1985); Physical Therapy Associates v. Pinal County, 734 P. 2d 1
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).

This Court supports that position in Juab

County Department of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d 49, 146
P.2d

1 (1967).

written

The six-year limitation regarding actions on

contracts,

therefore,

is

preferred

over

the

more

restrictive two-year corporate survival statute.
Corporate survival statutes are not, as the defendants allege,
to

be

strictly

construed.

As

stated

in

Midland

Financial

Corporation v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 110 Wis. 2d 261,
328 N.W. 2d 866, 867-68 (1982):
Section 180.7887 Stats, is a corporate survival statute.
This type of statute is of remedial nature and is to be
liberally construed.
That conclusion is consistent with Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2,
which deals with the construction of statutes, like Utah Code Ann.
§16-10-100, in derogation of the common law:

11

The rule of common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which
they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings
under them are to be liberally construed with a view to
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote
justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference
to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.
It is the nature of the right sued upon, and not the specific
form of the action or relief requested, which determines the
applicable statute of limitations.

Richards Engineering, Inc. v.

Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

That position was

supported by this Court in Taylor Brothers Co. v. Duden, 188 P.2d
1995 (Utah 1948).

The nature of this action is to collect under

the terms of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. As such,
this is an action on a written contract, governed by the six-year
limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2).
Case law and the facts of this action support the conclusion
that the six-year statute of limitations governs this case; not the
shorter two-year corporate survival statute. The trial court erred
in concluding

that

the

two-year

limitation

of

the

dissolution statute bars to the plaintiffs' claims.
POINT II
THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE SURVIVAL STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DICTATE THAT THE TWO-YEAR
LIMITATION PERIOD BE EXTENDED.

12

corporate

The two-year limitation of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 is not
absolute and may be extended under appropriate circumstances.
North American Asbestos v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 128
Cal. App. 3d 138 (1982).

As stated in Moore v. Nick's Fine Foods,

Inc. . 121 111. App. 3d 923, 460 N.E. 2d 420, 421 (1984):
We agree with the defendant that the general policy
behind the corporate dissolution statute is to set a
definitive point in time at which the existence of a
corporation and the transaction of its business are
terminated. (Citation omitted); however, we also note
that the two-year limitation on corporate survival is not
absolute and may be extended under certain circumstances.
(Citations omitted).
The circumstances of this case, and the principles of equity
allowed by Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2, dictate that the Travel Company
be allowed to pursue this claim.
This claim was initially filed in June of 1988, within the
defendant's claimed two-year limitation period.

That claim was

dismissed without prejudice because of a potential conflict of
interest of HattonTs prior counsel. Hatton continued to pursue the
claim with a filing in the federal court in Montana in March of
1991.

That case was dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, not on

the merits.

The plaintiffs now bring this action.

This case is similar to Striker v. Chester, 217 A.2d 31 (Del.
1966), in which trustees of a dissolved corporation brought an
action for "the recovery of moneys and other property" allegedly
belonging to the dissolved corporation.

13

Ld. at 36.

The claim had

initially

been

timely

filed,

but

went

through

a

convoluted

procedural history of many years, and questions were raised as to
whether the claim was filed after the corporate dissolution statute
expired.
In allowing

the claim

to go

forward,

the Striker Court

concluded:
As in most jurisdictions, the above cited Michigan
[corporate survival] statute governing the affairs of
corporations whose drafters have been voided in one
manner or another has been liberally interpreted in that
state, John J. Gamalski Hardware v. Baird, 298 Mich. 662,
299 N.W. 757, 136 A.C.R. 155. The cited case involved a
claim of replevin instituted for the repossession of
corporate property, such claiming having been filed more
than three years after the corporation's charter had been
forfeited.
The court declined to deprive such
corporation of its right. . . .
In other words, while
the so-called statutory death of a corporation in
Michigan clearly prevents any continuation of its normal
business as well as the instituting of a new suit, such
as one to enjoin the use of trade name once owned by a
corporation whose charter has been voided (citation
omitted), it does not prevent the prosecution of an
action which is directly related to the process of
winding up corporate affairs.
In discussing the type of "winding-up" action allowed even
after the expiration of the survival statute, the Striker Court
concluded:
While the present action seeks an accounting and other
equitable relief, it appears to me that what is basically
sought is the recovery of moneys and other property
allegedly belonging to Ridgeway under a claim instituted
on its behalf in 1957. No attempt is being made to
continue the corporate business or to institute a new
cause of action. In fact, what appears to be sought is
the taking over of a long pending claim.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the trustees are not
14

bound by the three-year statutory period of the Michigan
law and may prosecute the pending action. . . .
Id. at 36.
The facts of this case are similar to those in Striker.

The

plaintiffs here seek only recovery under the terms of the Purchase
Agreement and Promissory Note.
continue

the

corporation

Travel

Company

dissolution

This is not an attempt to somehow
business.

survival

statute

The

purposes

of

are not violated

the
by

allowing this claim to proceed.
Finally, equity requires that the defendants not be allowed to
raise the two-year statute to defeat the Travel Company's claim.
Such a ruling would allow companies purchasing the assets of
another

company

with

long-term

payout

contractually accepted responsibility.

provision

to

avoid

For example, in this case,

the Promissory Note provides for installment payments from April
30, 1986 through April 30, 1990. The Agreement also provides that
the Travel Company name and all other assets were transferred to
Morris Travel on the date of closing.

Morris Travel subsumed the

Travel Company, not using the Travel Company name or separate
business entity.

That's why the Travel Company was dissolved; it

didn't have any

reason

for a continuing

existence

after the

execution of the Purchase Agreement.
If its motion is granted, Morris is allowed to have the Travel
Company dissolved and claim that any payments due on the Note are,
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as a matter of law, unrecoverable, even when Morris specifically
contracted to make payments beyond the two-year period. That's not
right and shouldn't be allowed.

What would prevent a company from

buying another corporation, providing for a balloon payment for the
purchase price three years down the road and then voluntarily
dissolving the purchased corporation, avoiding any repayment?
For these reasons, the trial court erred in not extending the
two-year corporate survival statute in this case.
POINT III
THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE SURVIVAL STATUTE OF
UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10-100 APPLIES ONLY TO
PREDISSOLUTION CAUSES OF ACTION.
THIS CASE
INVOLVES A POSTDISSOLUTION CAUSE OF ACTION.
In Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d
184 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals clarified the
purpose and scope of the two-year corporate dissolution statute of
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100.

The Hansen opinion was issued on July

20, 1993, over a month after Judge Brian's Order and Final Judgment
in this case. While the Hansen case and the present case have some
similarities, the main focus of the Hansen was the applicability of
the "savings statute" of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 to claims filed
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100.

The language in the Hansen

decision important to this appeal is as follows:
The defendants breached the contract when the assets were
retained longer than contractually agreed upon. This
event created a cause of action. Section 16-10-100 of
the Utah Code places a two year limitation on the time in
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which a dissolved corporation can bring a suit for a
predissolution cause of action. Utah Code Ann. §16-10100 (1991). The corporate plaintiffs were dissolved on
December 31, 1984. The six-month period agreed upon by
the plaintiffs and defendants for returning the assets
ended on June 13, 1983, making the breach of the P & A
Agreement a predissolution cause of action.
Id. at 105. (Emphasis added).
Unlike the situation in Hansen, the plaintiffs1 cause of
action for breach of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note is
a

postdissolution

cause

of

action.

The

Travel

Company

was

involuntarily dissolved for failure to file an annual report on
October 1, 1987. (R. 74). After dissolution, the parties disagreed
over payments owed by Morris under the terms of the Purchase
Agreement and Promissory Note.

In February of 1988, Morris made

payment to the plaintiffs to cover installments due under the
Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note.

That payment covered

amounts due on April 30, 1987; July 31, 1987; October 31, 1987; and
January 31, 1988.

That February 1988 payment brought Morris

current on its obligations through Janaury 31, 1988.

The next

installment payment was due on April 30, 1988 (R. 137).
That April 30, 1988 was not made and on June 30, 1988, The
Travel Company, through prior counsel, filed a lawsuit in the Third
Judicial District Court against the defendants to collect moneys
owed under the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. (R. 75-96).
The plaintiffs' cause of action

for breach of the Purchase

Agreement and Promissory Note did not accrue until April 30, 1988,
when the owed installment payment was not made.
17

Based on those

dates, this is a postdissolution cause of action, which did not
accrue until approximately seven months after The Travel Company
was dissolved.
Under

Hansen,

the

plaintiffs

argue

that

the

two-year

dissolution statute does not apply to postdissolution causes of
action.

That makes sense.

The statute is designed to give

corporations a period of time to "wind up" corporate affairs. Any
cause of action accruing before dissolution can be brought within
two years.

That two-year statute should not, however, apply to

postdissolution causes of action.
cause

of

action,

dissolution.

If

it
the

may

not

two-year

Depending on the nature of the
accrue

until

statute

is

two

years

applied

to

after
those

postdissolution claims, a dissolved corporation may be deprived of
a cause of action before the cause of action accrues.

It is that

type of inequity which this Court has used to strike down as
unconstitutional similar statutes of limitations.

See Berry ex

rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
For these reasons, the two-year corporate survival statute
does not apply to postdissolution causes of action and cannot be
used to bar the plaintiffs* claims in this case.
POINT IV
EVEN IF THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
STATUTE APPLIES, THAT LIMITATION BARS ONLY
TRAVEL COMPANY CLAIMS, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL
CLAMS OF WILLIAM HATTON
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Even if the two-year corporate dissolution statute applies in
this case, it bars only Travel Company claims and has no effect on
William Hattonfs ability to pursue his individual claims against
the defendants under the terms of the Agreement and Promissory
Note.
A.

Hatton is in Direct Contractual Privity with Morris
Travel, Entitling Him to Bring this Claim Individually.
William Hatton, as an individual, is a separate party to the

Purchase Agreement.

The Travel Company and Morris Travel are

parties to the Purchase Agreement, having the Purchase Agreement
signed by their respective presidents.

William Hatton and Wanda

Hatton are individual signers of the Purchase Agreement.
133).

(R. 119,

Paragraph 19(b) of the Purchase Agreement specifically

provides that all of the terms of the Purchase Agreement are
"binding upon and inure to the benefit of . . . Buyer, Seller and
the Hattons."

(R. 203). If all of the Hattons* rights under the

Purchase Agreement

were

solely

derivative

through

the Travel

Company, it would be meaningless to identify them as separate
parties to the Agreement.
Basic rules of contract construction provide that provisions
of a contract are deemed to be included for a reason and that
construction

of

an

agreement

meaningless should be avoided.

which

renders

any

construed

of

it

Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane and

Equipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 (1984).
is to be strictly

part

against

its drafter.

A contract
Sears v.

Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); Matter of Orris' Estate, 622
19

P2d 337 (Utah 1980).

Except for minor alterations, the Purchase

Agreement was drafted by lawyers of Morris Travel.

(R. 143-144).

If there is any ambiguity or inconsistency in the contract, it
must, therefore, be strictly construed against Morris Travel. The
Purchase Agreement is unambiguous in granting individual rights to
the Hattons to enforce it. (R. 203).

Any individual claim is

governed by the six-year limitation of Utah Code Ann §78-12-23(2)
and is timely filed.
Hatton can pursue this claim because he is an individual party
to the Purchase Agreement.

Just because he is also a shareholder

in the dissolved corporation does not change that.

As a general

rule, a shareholder has no individual cause of action for injuries
to his corporation.

This rule is designed to prevent multiple

suits against the wrongdoer.

Any other rule would allow "as many

suits against the wrongdoer as there were stockholders in the
corporation."

Wells v. Paine, 101 Me. 67, 63 A. 324, 235 (1905).

There are two major exceptions to that general rule.

First, a

shareholder may bring an individual action where the shareholder
suffered an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by
other

shareholders

individual

and,

action where

second,
there

between

a

shareholder

is a special

the

duty,

wrongdoer

bring
such
and

an

as a

contractual

duty,

shareholder.

Hikita v. Nichiro Gyoqyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197
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alleged

may

the

(Alaska

1986);

W.

Fletcher,

Corporations, §5991 at 421
disjunctive, not conjunctive.

Cyclopedia

(1984).

of

Law

of

Private

These two exceptions are

The Hikita Court states:

We hold that a shareholder can sue for breach of contract
to which he is a party, even if he has not suffered an
injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other
shareholders. . . . "Unquestionably a stockholder may
bring suit in his own name to recover damages. . . for
acts which are violations of a duty arising from contract
or otherwise and owing directly . . . to the injured
stockholder, though such acts are also violations of duty
owing to the corporation." (Citation omitted).
Id. at 1200.
There can be no dispute that William Hatton is a party to the
Purchase Agreement with the defendants.

As such, he has an

individual claim for breach of the Purchase Agreement.

According

to his divorce settlement with Wanda Hatton, William Hatton was
given the authority to pursue this claim on behalf of himself and
Wanda Hatton.
B.

(R. 136).

Hatton is Entitled to Pursue His Individual Claim Because
Any and All Assets of the Travel Company, as a Dissolved
Corporation, Vest in its Stockholders
In addition to his ability to bring an individual claim on the

contract, Hatton is allowed to pursue this individual claim because
of his interest

in the dissolved

corporation's

assets.

The

dissolution of a corporation does not terminate the property rights
of the stockholders.

The property of the corporation becomes

vested in its members and stockholders upon dissolution.
21

Levy v.

Liebling,

238 F.2d

505

(7th Cir. 1956),

The Court in Levy

continued:
Thus, we thing it can hardly be open
the stockholders, at the time Imperial
all purposes including the two-year
Kentucky law for the winding up of its
the title to and became the owners of
they now seek to enforce. . . .

to doubt but that
became extinct for
period allowed by
business, acquired
the judgment which

It is thus our conclusion that plaintiffs were not
lacking in capacity to sue because Imperial, of which
they were former stockholders, after its dissolution
lacked such capacity.
This position is supported by the dissolution distribution
procedure in Utah applicable when this cause of action arose.

See

Utah Code Ann. §§16-10-87; 16-10-93; 16-10-97.
The time within which an individual must bring a claim on a
contract is the six-year limitation period of Utah Code Ann. §7812-23(2).

This individual contract claim was brought within that

six-year limitation period
C.

Hatton
may
Pursue
this
Claim
Individually
as
a
Third-Party
Beneficiary
of
the
Purchase
Agreement between Morris Travel and
The Travel Company

If, for any reason, this Court concludes that Hatton is not a
direct named party to the Purchase Agreement and/or Promissory
Note, Hatton may still pursue this claim individually as a thirdparty beneficiary to the Purchase Agreement between Morris Travel
and the Travel Company.

This Court has stated:
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Where it appears from the promise or the contracting
situation that the parties intended that a third party
receive a benefit, the third party may enforce his rights
in the courts and is deemed a donee beneficiary. Where,
however, no intention to make a gift appears and
performance of the promise satisfies or recognizes an
actual or supposed duty of the promise to the
beneficiary, then the third party may still recover as a
creditor beneficiary.
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315-16
(Utah 1982).
It is clear from the contracting circumstances that William
and Wanda Hatton are creditor beneficiaries of the Promissory Note
between Morris Travel and the Travel Company.

Everyone knew the

Hattons were the sole shareholders and the only individuals to
receive payment under the Note. The Travel Company was going to be
incorporated into Morris Travel.

This is confirmed by the letter

from Morris Travel's counsel (R. 141-142), requiring approval by
William and Wanda Hatton regarding payments made on the Note.
CONCLUSION
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is the sixyear limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2); not the two-year
corporate

dissolution

statute

of

Utah

Code

Ann. §16-10-100.

Further, that two-year limitation only applies to predissolution
causes of action, not the plaintiffs1 postdissolution cause of
action. Even if this Court determines that the two-year limitation
of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 does apply
limitation is not absolute.

to this case, that

The facts of this case and equity
23

support the extension of that limitation period. This is an action
in the nature of "winding up" the affairs of the Travel Company,
The purposes of the corporation survival statute are not violated
by allowing the Travel Company's claim to proceed.
Regardless of the trial courtf s conclusions regarding the
claims of The Travel Company, William Hatton is entitled to pursue
his individual claim against Morris.

Hatton is a named party to

the Purchase Agreement and in direct contractual privity with the
defendants, entitled to pursue his individual claim.

Hatton is

also entitled to pursue this individual claim as the assets of the
Travel Company passed to him on dissolution.

Finally, Hatton is

clearly a third party creditor beneficiary of the Agreement and
Promissory Note.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting the
defendants1

motion

for

summary

judgment.

The

trial

court's

conclusions should be reversed and this case should be remanded to
the trial court for trial on the merits.
DATED this £>E

»day of January, 1994.

GORDON K. JENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDUM

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

16-10-100- Survival of remedy after dissolution.
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) by a
decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of
duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against
the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other
proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of such
dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the corporation may
be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other
action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such
corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such
period of two years so as to extend its period of duration.

68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed — Rules of equity prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
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On June 4, 1993, the Court heard argument on
defendant Morris Travel Express Corporation's ("Morris")
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Alternatively for
Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs The Travel Company and William

Hatton ("Hatton") were represented by Gordon Jensen and
defendant Morris was represented by Alan C. Bradshaw.

Both

parties presented matters outside of the pleadings including
documentary evidence and in accordance with Rule 12(c), Utah
R. Civ. P., the Court treats Morris' motion as a Motion for
Summary Judgment under Rule 56.

Plaintiffs did not dispute

the facts recited in support of Morris' motion and those facts
are deemed admitted pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Admin.
Rule 4-501(2) (b) .l Having considered the arguments of counsel
and having reviewed the memoranda and submissions of the
parties, the Court hereby Orders and presents ins findings as
follows:
1.

The Court finds that pursuant to the unambiguous

terms of the Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Assets ("Asset
Purchase Agreement") as well as the Note attached as an
exhibit to the Asset Purchase Agreement, all monetary or other
unsatisfied obligations allegedly owed by Morris are corporate
claims of The Travel Company and Hatton has no claim
concerning those obligations.

Specifically, amounts allegedly

owed under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Asset Purchase Agreement
and under the Note are obligations owed The Travel Company.
The Court finds that the Note and Ass.et Purchase Agreement,
including paragraph 19(b) of the Asset Purchase Agreement, do
not give Hatton any claim to sue for the obligations due The
Travel Company.
2.

The claims under the Note and Asset Purchase

Agreement, whether asserted by Hatton or The Travel Company,
must be timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) .

Concerning ^10 °f Morris' Statement of Facts, plaintiffs admitted the
fact that it accepted a payment in 1988 but added their contention that
the acceptance "was not intended as a resolution of this claim."
Opposition Memo at 3.

Based upon the undisputed facts, those claims were not timely
asserted under § 16-10-100.
3.

The Court finds that its ruling is further

supported by the following:
(a)

The 1988 Complaint filed by Hatton on

behalf of The Travel Company asserts these same claims and
does so on the basis that the claims are corporate obligations
owed The Travel Company;
(b)

The documents filed in Hatton's divorce

proceeding provide that potential claims to be asserted
against Morris are corporate claims of The Travel Company and
that Hatton and his spouse are successor shareholders of those
corporate claims; and
(c)

The substantive allegations contained in

plaintiffs' present Complaint are limited to claims that The
Travel Company is owed obligations by Morris.
4.

Based upon but not limited to all of the reasons

cited above, the Court hereby grants Morris' motion and
plaintiffs 7 Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

/ // day of June, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

AGREEMENT FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE
OF ASSETS

COPY

THIS AGREEMENT, dated as of April 15, 1985, is
entered into by and between THE TRAVEL COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation ("Seller"), MORRIS TRAVEL CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation ("Buyer"), and WILLIAM AND WANDA HATTON
(the "Hattons").

Recitals
A.

Seller owns and operates a travel agency

located at the following three offices:

2089 W. North

Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116; 5151 Wiley Post Way,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116; and 515 East 100 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.

Seller is doing business at all

locations under the name "The Travel Company."
B.

Seller desires to sell the Assets (as

defined below) used by Seller in the operation of its
business and the Buyer desires to purchase the same, upon
the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement.
C.

The Hattons own all of the stock of Seller.

The Hattons are joining in and agreeing to be bound by
this Agreement in consideration of Buyer's entering into
this Agreement.

Agreement
In consideration of the recitals and mutual
promises contained herein, Seller and Buyer hereby agree
as follows:
1.

Sale and Purchase,

On the date of the

Closing (as hereinafter defined), subject to the terms and
cor.ditiions hereinafter set forth, Seller agrees to sell,
transfer and convey to Buyer, and Buyer agrees to purchase
from Seller, ail right, title and interest of Seller in
and co the following:
(a)

The name "The Travel Company," and all

variations and derivations thereof and all goodwill
associated therewith, as such names are now or formerly
have been used by Seller in connection with Seller's
business operations in the state of Utah or any other
s : 2 •; e .
[hi
s-.t'-iies
tile

All office

including., w i t h o u t

cabinets,

typewriters,

furniture,

limitation,
computer

equip:u(-:-t a n d
ces\sf

terminals

chairs,
and printed

.n~cerials located at Seller's place of business or
otherwise used in connection with Seller's business (the
"Office Equipment").
(c)

All of Seller's accounts, customer

lists, records, computer tapes, computer discs, and other
documents and any ether form of information relating to
ths ooera-ior. of Seller's travel business ani the
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telephone numbers utilized by Seller.

At Closing, Seller

shall provide to Buyer a complete list of Seller's
accounts as of the Closing date.
(d)
dated

The three lease agreements

,

, and

_,

respectively, (the "Office Leases"), for occupancy of
Seller's three business locations (collectively, the
"Premises").
(e)

All airline equipment leases (the

"Airline Equipment Leases") to which Seller is a party.
(f)

All deposits on hand at the time of the

Closing in respect of future travel arrangements for
customers of Seller and the commissions to be earned with
respect thereto, subject to the provisions of Section 6^
and Section 14 below.
(g)

.../

/.

^ .< .u*<i< ?

Any goodwill relating to Seller's

business not already described in paragraph 1(a) above.
(h)

Any other assets, including without

limitation any other leases or contracts, used by Seller
in connection with its business, except for Seller's safe
and Seller's automobiles; provided, however, that the
automobile currently used by Wanda Hatton shall be
included among the assets assigned to Buyer.
The items described in paragraphs 1(a) through
1(h) above are collectively referred to as the "Assets."
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2.

Purchase Price and Payment Terms.

Buyer

agrees to pay a total purchase price of $700f000 for the
Assets.

$50,000 of the purchase price shall be allocated

to the covenant not to compete with Buyer, more
particularly described in Section 7 below.

The remaining

portion of the purchase price shall be allocated in a
manner agreed by the parties at or prior to Closing.

The

purchase price shall be paid as follows:
(a)

At the time this Agreement is executed,

Buyer shall deliver to Thomas E. Kelly of Holme Roberts &
Owen the sum of $75,000 as an earnest money deposit to be
held in escrow.

At the Closing, this deposit shall be

paid to Seller as part of the purchase price for the
Assets.

If the Closing does not occur on May 3, 1985, or

before, for any reason other than Buyer's wrongful failure
under the terms of this Agreement to close, the entire
deposit shall be immediately returned to Buyer.

If the

Closing does not occur solely because of Buyer's wrongful
failure to close under the terms of this Agreement, then
the $75,000 deposit shall be paid to Seller as liquidated
damages, and not

as a penalty.

(b)

The additional sum of $125,000 shall be

paid by Buyer to Seller at Closing hereunder in cash,
certified funds or cashier's check; and
(c)

The sum of $500,000 (the "Deferred

Payment"), subject to adjustment as described in Section 5
below, shall be paid by Buyer to Seller as follows:
-4-

On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On

A p r i l 3 0 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 8 8 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1990, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1990, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 .

I n t e r e s t s h a l l accrue on the o u t s t a n d i n g unpaid p r i n c i p a l
amount of the Deferred Payment at a r a t e equal to the
l e s s e r of 10% per annum or the prime r a t e of F i r s t
I n t e r s t a t e Bank of Utah, N.A., on the f i r s t day of each
q u a r t e r l y p e r i o d d e s c r i b e d in the above schedule of
payments.

(For purposes of t h i s paragraph, "prime r a t e "

s h a l l mean the lowest r a t e charged by F i r s t
Bank to i t s commercial customers.)

Interstate

Accrued i n t e r e s t

be due and payable at the time of the f i r s t

shall

principal

i n s t a l l m e n t payment on A p r i l 30, 1986, and at the time of
each succeeding p r i n c i p a l payment d e s c r i b e d above.

The

Deferred Payment s h a l l be evidenced by a promissory note
s u b s t a n t i a l l y in the form of Exhibit "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o
and made p a r t hereof.
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3.

Additional Payments to Seller.
(a)

In addition to the payments described

in Section 2 above, Seller shall be entitled to receive
from Buyer the possible additional payments described in
this Section 3.
(b)

For purposes of this Section 3, the

following terms shall have the following definitions:
(i)

The Travel Company Accounts.

All customer accounts of Seller at the time of the
Closing, together with any additional accounts originated
at the Premises during the period, if any, after Closing
when Buyer continues to conduct business on the Premises
and the Premises are accounted for by Buyer as separate
profit centers.

At such time as Buyer ceases to account

for the Premises as separate profit centers, Buyer shall
list for future accounting purposes all customer accounts
then allocated to the Premises (including all customer
accounts of Seller at the time of Closing).

In addition,

the term "The Travel Company Accounts" is defined to
include any new accounts obtained for Buyer by the
Hattons, or either of them, at any time following Closing
until April 30, 1990.
(ii)

The Travel Company Revenues.

All commissions or other forms of gross profits, less any
commission sharing, that are obtained by Buyer as a result
of The Travel Company Accounts.
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"The Travel Company

Revenues" is also defined to include The Travel Company's
allocated share of all overrides and hotel and car
commissions received by Buyer.

This allocated share shall

be determined by the following formula:

Annual ARC Billings
for Travel Company Accounts
Total Annual ARC

x

Billings of Buyer

(c)

Buyer's Annual
Overrides and
Hotel and Car

Amount to be
Included in
Calculating

=

Commissions

Travel Company Revenue

During each of the first five years

following the Closing through April 30, 1990, Seller shall
be entitled to 30% of the amount by which The Travel
Company Revenues during any such year exceed the sum of
$700,000.

Any payments to which Seller is entitled under

this paragraph are referred to in this Agreement as "Earn
Out Payments."

The Earn Out Payments, if any, to which

Seller is entitled during the first five years after
Closing shall be paid in the following manner:
(i)

within 30 days after the end of

the first quarter of each year, Buyer shail pay to Seller
30% of all Travel Company Revenues for such quarter in
excess of $175,000;
(ii) within 30 days after the end of
the second quarter of each year, Buyer shall pay to Seller
that amount which, when added to any first quarter Earn
Out Payment, equals 30% of all Travel Company Revenues in
excess of $350,0C0 for the first two quarters of the year;
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(iii) within 30 days after the end of
the third quarter of each year, Buyer shall pay to Seller
that amount which, when added to any first and second
quarter Earn Out Payments, equals 30% of all Travel
Company Revenues in excess

of $525,000 for the first three

quarters of the year; and
(iv) within 30 days after the end of
each year, Buyer shall pay to Seller that amount which,
when added to any first, second and third quarter Earn Out
Payments, equals 30% of Travel Company Revenues in excess
of $700,000 for the year.
(v)

If in any year the aggregate total

of quarterly Earn Out Payments received by Seller exceeds
30% of Travel Company Revenues over $700,000 for the year,
Buyer may deduct that excess

from either future Earn Out

Payments or from payments under the Deferred Payment Note.
4.

Adjustment of Purchase Price.

The

purchase price described in paragraph 2 above has been
calculated based upon the assumption that all or the great
majority of accounts serviced by Seller at Closing shall
remain with Buyer.

Seller anticipates that the accounts

assigned to Buyer at Closing (as disclosed by the list to
be provided pursuant to paragraph 1(c) above) will
generate a commission volume of at least $700,000 from May
1, 1985 through April 30, 1986.
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If actual commissions for

such period from the accounts listed are less than
$700,000, the Deferred Payment to be paid by Buyer to
Seller shall be reduced as follows:
(a)

If commissions received are not more

than 10% below $700,000, there shall be no Deferred
Payment reduction.
(b)

If commissions received are between

10.1% and 15% below $700,000, then for every $1.00 in
annualized commission revenues not obtained, the Deferred
Payment shall be reduced by $.50 for this incremental
shortfall only.
(c)

If commissions received are between

15.1% and 20% below $700,000, then for every $1.00 in
annualized commission revenues not obtained, there will be
a $1.00 downward adjustment in the Deferred Payment for
this incremental shortfall only.
(d)

If commissions actually received are

more than 20.1% below $700,000, then for every $1.00 in
annualized commission revenues not obtained, there will be
a $1.50 downward adjustment in the Deferred Payment for
this incremental shortfall only.
(e)

Any downward adjustments to the

Deferred Payment pursuant to the foregoing provisions
shall be subtracted starting with the last installment due
under paragraph 2 above and proceeding forward in time as
necessary.
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5.

No Assumption of Liabilities.

Except

with respect to the Office Leases, the Airline Equipment
Leases, the unearned commissions described in Section 6
below, and any other contracts specifically assigned to
Buyer at Closing, Buyer is not assuming any liabilities or
obligations of, or claims against, Seller or the Hattons,
whether fixed or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated.
Seller and the Hattons agree to indemnify and hold Buyer
harmless from any and all such liabilities.
6.

Advanced Commissions.
(a)

The parties acknowledge that among the

Assets being assigned to Buyer by Seller are advanced
commissions received by Seller for certain tours and
cruises already scheduled by Seller.

At Closing, Seller

and Buyer shall initial for identification a list of all
advanced commissions being assigned to Buyer.

Not more

than two weeks after the completion of each listed tour or
cruise, the entire commission relating thereto, minus
direct expenses attributable to such tour or cruise
(including salaries, postage, publicity and such items,
but not including general overhead) shall be paid by Buyer
to Seller.

If direct expenses from any listed tour or

cruise exceed the commissions received with respect
thereto, Seller shall reimburse Buyer within two weeks of
demand for all such expenses in excess

of commissions.

Seller fails to reimburse Buyer, Buyer may offset the
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If

amounts to which it is entitled against any of Buyer's
obligations to Seller.
(b)

In addition, Seller shall assign to

Buyer at Closing all advanced commissions relating to a
National ACRE Conference scheduled for March, 1987, in
Hawaii,

Buyer shall not have the responsibility to pay to

Seller any commissions relating to this tour, nor shall
Seller be responsible to Buyer for any losses resulting
from this tour.
(c)

If Seller has received any advanced

commissions other than those specifically set forth on the
list to be delivered at Closing as described in paragraph
6(a) above, such other advanced commissions shall remain
the property of Seller following the Closing, and Buyer
shall assume no liability whatsoever to provide the
services for which such commissions were paid to Seller.
(d)

The provisions of this Section 6 are

subject to the provisions of Section 14 below.
1.

Confidentiality and Covenant Not to Compete.
(a)

In order to protect the purchase of the

Assets, Seller and the Hattons agree that they will not,
individually or collectively, or in conjunction with
others, at any time after execution hereof, except with
the express prior written consent of Buyer, directly or
indirectly, disclose, communicate or divulge to any
"Person" (which is defined to include any natural person,
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corporation, trust, estate, partnership or other entity),
or use for the benefit of any Person, any knowledge or
information with respect to the conduct or details of
Seller's business being sold to Buyer hereunder including,
but not limited to, accounts, details of all contracts,
client lists, fees, costs, marketing methods, trade
secrets or confidential information.
(b)

Seller and the Hattons each covenant

and agree that they will not, for the period commencing on
the date hereof and continuing until five years after the
Closing Date, except with the express prior written
consent of Buyer, directly or indirectly, whether as
employee, owner, partner, agent, shareholder or in any
other capacity, for its or their accounts or for the
benefit of any Person in any business in competition with
Buyer:
(i)

Solicit, divert, accept business

from or otherwise take away or interfere with any former,
present or future customer or account of Buyer or former
or present customers or accounts of Seller, including, but
not limited to, all customers and accounts directly or
indirectly previously or in the future produced or
generated by Seller or the Hattons;
(ii) Solicit, divert or induce any of
Seller's employees to leave Seller's business being sold
hereunder or to work for Seller or either of the Hattons
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or any Person with which Seller or either of the Hattons
is connected.
(c)

Seller and the Hattons each covenant

and agree that they will not, for the period commencing on
the date hereof and continuing until five years after the
Closing Date, in any capacity (including, but not limited
to, owner, partner, shareholder, consultant, agent,
employee or otherwise), directly or indirectly, for their
own accounts or for the benefit of any Person, establish,
engage in or be connected with any travel-related business
in competition with Buyer, within the State of Utah,
(d)

Wanda Hatton shall execute at Closing

an employment agreement in a form substantially similar to
Exhibit B hereto, or such other form mutually agreed upon
by the parties.
(e)

The parties agree that any breach by

Seller or the Hattons of the covenants and agreements
contained in this Section 7 will result in irreparable
injury to.Buyer for which money damages could not
adequately compensate Buyer, and, therefore, in the event
of any such breach, Buyer shall be entitled (in addition
to any other rights and remedies which it may have at law
or in equity) to have an injunction issued by any
competent court of equity enjoining and restraining Seller
and the Hattons, or either of them, and any other Person
involved therein from continuing such breach.
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(f)

If any portions of the covenants or

agreements contained herein, or the application thereof,
are construed to be invalid or unenforceable, then the
other portions of such covenant(s) or agreement(s) or the
application thereof shall be given full force and effect
without regard to the invalid or unenforceable portions.
If any covenant or agreement herein is held to be
unenforceable because of the area covered, the duration
thereof or the scope thereof, then the court making such
determination shall have the power to reduce the area or
duration or limit the scope thereof, and the covenant or
agreement shall then be enforceable in its reduced and/or
limited form.
8.

Closing.

The closing hereunder

("Closing") shall take place on May 3, 1985, at 10:00 a.m.
at Buyer's offices, or such other time and place as shall
be agreed to by all parties hereto. For accounting
purposes, the Closing shall be effective as of April 28,
1985.
9.

Representations and Warranties of Seller

and the Hattons.

Seller and the Hattons, jointly and

severally, warrant and represent the following:
(a)

(i) Seller is a corporation duly

organized, validly existing and in good standing under
Utah law, has the corporate power to own the Assets and
enter into this Agreement and perform the transactions

-14-

contemplated hereby, and carry on its business as and
where such business is now conducted; Seller has all
licenses and permits required to conduct Seller's business
and such business is being conducted in compliance with
all applicable Federal, State and local laws;
(ii) Within the past five years in the
State of Utah, neither Seller nor the Hattons have done
travel-related business under or been known by any name
other than The Travel Company; and
(iii) The sale, transfer, assignment,
conveyance and delivery of the Assets conveyed and
assigned hereunder to Buyer, and the Execution and
performance by Seller and the Hattons of this Agreement
comply with all relevant Federal, State and local laws,
and will not violate, conflict with, or result in a breach
of or default or liability under Seller's Articles of
Incorporation or Bylaws, or any agreement or instrument to
which Seller is a party or result in the creation or
imposition of any mortgage, lien, security interest,
encumbrance or pledge, or, to the best of Seller's and the
Hatton's knowledge, any executions, attachments or claims
in or to any of their property or the Assets.
(b)

(i)

Seller is, and upon Closing

hereunder, Buyer will be, the sole and unconditional owner
of, with good and absolute legal and equitable title
thereto, all of the Assets, free and clear of all
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mortgages, liens, security interests, pledges, charges,
encumbrances, or, to the best of Seller's and the Hatton's
knowledge, all executions, attachments and claims;
(ii) The copies of the Office Lease and
the Airline Equipment Leases provided to Buyer are true,
complete and correct copies thereof, and there are no oral
understandings that differ from or vary the terms
thereof.

To the best of Seller's and the Hatton's

knowledge, no party to any such lease or any other
contract specifically assigned to Buyer is in default;
(iii) Seller has the full and
unrestricted right to use the name "The Travel Company"
and variations thereof in the State of Utah without
obligation to pay any royalty fee or other compensation
and its use does not infringe upon any other tradename,
servicemark or trademark;
(iv) Seller has no union contracts, no
employees except for the Hattons and those disclosed in
writing to Buyer, and no pension or profit sharing or
other benefit plans;
(v)

Seller is not a party to any

contracts, whether written or oral, except the Office
Leases and the Airline Equipment Leases, and except as
have been disclosed to Buyer by Seller in writing.
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(c)

(i)

The execution and performance of

this Agreement have been duly and validly authorized by
Seller's shareholders and Board of Directors;
(ii) All lists, schedules, exhibits,
documents, certifications, financial statements,
certificates, contracts and other papers given or to be
given hereunder or in connection with or attached to this
Agreement and all representations and warranties by Seller
and the Hattons to Buyer are true, correct and complete.
The financial statements given to Buyer by Seller fairly
and completely present the financial condition of Seller
at the dates indicated and the results of operations for
the periods ended on such dates, and have been prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
consistently followed throughout the periods indicated;
(iii) All debts, liabilities and
obligations of Seller including, but not limited to, taxes
have been satisfied;
(iv) No breach of contract, tort or
other claim (whether arising from Seller's business
operations or otherwise) has been asserted by any
employee, creditor, claimant or other person against
Seller nor has there, to the best of Seller's or the
Hatton's knowledge, been any occurrence which could give
rise to such a claim; nor has any suit, action or
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proceeding been threatened or commenced against Seller
involving such a claim;
(v)

The execution and performance of

this Agreement shall not render Buyer liable for any of
Seller's or the Hatton's debts, liabilities or obligations
(except under the Office Leases, the Airline Equipment
Leases and any other contracts specifically assigned to
Buyer, and with respect to any unearned commissions
assigned to Buyer pursuant to Section 6 above), now
existing or hereafter arising, to employees, creditors,
claimants or other persons, including, but not limited to,
tax obligations, employment contracts, or pension, profit
sharing or other benefit plans; and
(vi) No suit, action or proceeding is
pending or threatened which would restrain the execution
or performance of this Agreement.
10,

Representations and Warranties of Buyer.

Buyer represents and warrants as follows:
(a)

Buyer is a corporation validly

organized and in good standing under the laws of the State
of Utah, has the corporate power to own its assets and to
enter into this Agreement and perform the transactions
contemplated hereby, and carry on its business as and
where such business is now conducted; Buyer has all
licenses and permits required to conduct Buyer's business
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and such business is being conducted in compliance with
all applicable federal, state and local lavs;
(b)

The execution and performance of this

Agreement have been duly authorized by all requisite
corporate action on the part of Buyer and its shareholders
and directors;
(c)

No suitf action or proceeding is

pending or threatened that would restrain the execution
and performance of this Agreement by Buyer; and
(d)

Buyer has examined the Office Equipment

and agrees to accept it "as is."
11.

Conduct Pending Closing.

From and after

the date hereof to, and including, the time of Closing:
(a)

Seller and the Hattons shall fully

cooperate with Buyer and, in order to facilitate the
consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby in a
smooth and orderly fashion, take such actions as are
reasonably requested by Buyer, including without
limitation:
(i)

Delivering to Buyer all notices,

correspondence, and other items relating to the Assets and
business of Seller which are from time to time received by
or are in the possession of any of them;
(ii) Assisting Buyer in transferring
operations at the Premises on an uninterrupted basis,
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including, but not limited to, introducing Buyer and
Buyer's employees to customers and customers1 employees;
(iii) Paying all of Seller's debts,
liabilities and obligations, including, but not limited to
taxes, as they become due.
(b)

Seller and the Hattons shall conduct

the business in a good and diligent manner consistent with
past practice and shall not, except with the prior written
consent of Buyer, make any change in their business
practices, and shall in good faith use their best efforts
to preserve the business as a going concern, including,
without limitation:
(i)

Keeping available the services of

their current officers, employees, salesmen,agents and
representat ives;
(ii) Maintaining the good will of their
suppliers, customers and other Persons having business
relations with threm; and
(iii) Continuing promotional activities
and advertising of a nature and at levels consistent with
past practices,
(c)

Seller shall not, except with the prior

written consent of Buyer, do any of the following:
(i)

Make any disposition of any of the

Assets;
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(ii) Begin to engage in any significant
new type of business;
(iii) Enter into or commit to enter
into any new contract or amend any existing contract or,
other than in the ordinary course of business, grant any
salary increase, bonus, or other form of compensation,
payable to any officer, employee or agent.
12.

Conditions Precedent to the Buyer's Obligation

to Complete Closing.

The obligation of Buyer to close

hereunder is subject to the satisfaction on or prior to
the Closing of the following conditions precedent, any of
which may be waived by Buyer at or prior to the Closing
date.
(a)

The representations and warranties of

Seller and the Hattons contained in this Agreement shall
be true on and as of the Closing Date with the same effect
as though such representations and warranties had been
made on and as of such date;
(b)

Seller shall have fully performed,

satisfied and complied with all of the covenants,
agreements and conditions in this Agreement on its part to
be performed on or prior to Closing;
(c)

There shall have been no material or

adverse change in Seller's business or financial condition
between the date hereof and Closing Date;
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(d)

Buyer shall have been given the

opportunity to review and examine to its reasonable
satisfaction the Assets and all contracts, leases,
records, documents or other information relating to the
Assets.
(e)

Seller shall deliver to Buyer:
(i)

One or more instruments or

documents, in form satisfactory to Buyer and its counsel,
transferring and assigning the Assets to Buyer;
(ii) A legal opinion dated as of the
Closing Date, of counsel for Seller admitted to practice
in the State of Utah in form and substance satisfactory to
Buyer and its counsel;
(iii) An employment agreement
substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B, or
such other form as the parties shall agree, executed by
Wanda Hatton.
(iv) A written "Implementation Plan"
reasonably satisfactory to Buyer specifying the manner in
which Buyer will be introduced to Seller's customers.
(f)

Prior to Closing, Buyer shall have

obtained the following:
(i)

A certificate from the Utah

Division of Commercial Code, or other evidence reasonably
satisfactory to Buyer, confirming that the Assets are
subject to no lien or encumbrance;
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(ii) Approval by the ARC and the IATA
to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by
this Agreement, including the operation of the. existing
Travel Company offices by Buyer, or written assurances
satisfactory to Buyer and its counsel that such consents
are not required to consummate the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement.
(iii) The written consent of the
various landlords to the assignment of the Office Leases
to Buyer, the written consent of the applicable airlines
to the assignment of the Airline Equipment Leases, and
such consents as Buyer shall deem necessary to the
assignment of any other contracts to Buyer,

Each such

consent shall include a statement by the consenting party
to the effect that the lease or contract is in full force
and effect and that there is no default thereunder;
(iv) A certificate, dated as of a
recent date from the Secretary of the State of Utah that
Seller is in good standing and a certificate also dated as
of a recent date, from the appropriate department of the
State of Utah showing there are no unpaid corporate taxes
owed by Seller; and
(g)

Buyer and Seller shall have reached a

mutually acceptable agreement as to whether, and in what
form, one or more personal guarantees shall be given to
Seller at Closing.
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13.

Conditions Precedent to Seller's Obligation

to Complete Closing,

The obligation of Seller to close

hereunder is subject to the satisfaction at or prior to
the Closing of the following conditions precedent, any of
which may be waived by Seller at or prior to the Closing
date.
(a)

The representations and warranties of

Buyer contained in this Agreement shall be true on and as
of the Closing date with the same effect as though such
representations and warranties had been made on and as of
such date;
(b)

Buyer shall have fully performed, .

satisfied and complied with any covenants, agreements or
conditionsin this Agreement on its part to be performed on
or prior to Closing;
(c)

Buyer shall deliver to Seller:
(i)

the Promissory Note substantially

in the form of Exhibit A hereto;
(ii) the sum of $125,000 in cash, or
certified funds or a cashierfs check, together with the earnest money deposit of $75,000 described in Section 2(a)
above;
(iii) a legal opinion dated as of the
Closing Date, of counsel for Buyer, in form and substance
reasonably satisfactory to Seller and its counsel; and
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(d)

Buyer and Seller shall have reached a

mutually acceptable agreement as to whether, and in what
form, one or more personal guarantees shall be given to
Seller at Closing.
14.

Seller's Accounts Receivable.

Seller's

accounts receivable existing as of April 28, 1985, are
expressly excluded from the transfer of the Assets
described herein.

Seller, however, appoints Buyer as

Seller's agent to receive payments on Seller's accounts
receivable and to send notices to Seller's customers to
make payments to Buyer or otherwise demand payments from
such customers.

Except if otherwise designated by the

customer, all monies received by Buyer shall be applied to
the oldest outstanding invoice to such customer and Buyer
shall account and make payments to Seller monthly within
fifteen (15) days after the end of any month for monies
collected during the preceding calendar month.

On or

about December 31, 1985, Buyer shall return all
uncollected accounts to Seller (thereby terminating
Buyer's agency) who shall thereafter have the right to
collect the same in any manner Seller sees

fit, provided,

however, that Buyer shall have the option, in its sole
discretion, to then purchase any of Seller's uncollected
accounts for the full unpaid account balance thereof.
Buyer shall receive payments merely as Seller's agent and
shall have no obligation or duty to institute suits, incur
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any expense or take any other action to collect Seller's
accounts receivable.
15.

Brokers* Fees and Indemnification.
(a)

Seller and the Hattons, jointly and

severally, represent and warrant to Buyer that none of
them has employed or retained any broker or finder in
connection with the transaction contemplated by this
Agreement, other than Sontag, Annis & Associates (if so
characterized), and none of them has had any dealings with
any Person which may entitle that Person to a fee or
commission.

Seller shall be solely responsible for the

payment of any fee or commission due to Sontag, Annis &
Associates, Incorporated.
(b)

Each of the parties indemnifies and

holds the other harmless from and against any debts,
liabilities and obligations or claims, by virtue of any
arrangement or commitment made by him or it with or to any
Person that may entitle such Person to any fee or
commission from such other party to this Agreement.
(c)

Seller and the Hattons, all jointly and

severally, shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless
Buyer, its successors and assigns from, against and in
respect of:
(i)

all debts, liabilities and

obligations of or claims against Seller or the Hattons or
the Assets asserted against or collected from Buyer;
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(ii) any damage, loss or deficiency
resulting from any misrepresentation, breach of warranty
or nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement on the part
of Seller or the Hattons under this Agreement or any other
document executed in connection herewith; and
(iii) all actions, suits, proceedings,
demands, settlements, assessments, judgments, costs,
investigation expenses, interest, penalties, legal fees
and expenses incident to any of the foregoing.
(d)

Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold

harmless Seller and the Hattons, and their successors and
assigns, from, against and in respect of:
(i)

any damage, loss or deficiency

resulting from any misrepresentation, breach of warranty
or nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement on the part
of Buyer under this Agreement or any other document
executed in connection herewith; and
(ii) all actions, suits, proceedings,
demands, settlements, assessments, judgments, costs,
investigation expenses, interests, penalties, legal fees
and expenses reasonably instant to any of the foregoing
matters described in Section 15(d)(i) above.
16.

Survival of Representations and Warranties.

All representations, warranties and agreements made by
Seller or the Hattons or Buyer in this Agreement or
pursuant hereto are continuing and survive the execution
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and performance of, and Closing under, this Agreement, the
delivery of any documents, certifications, lists and
instruments required hereunder and any investigation or
inspection at any time made by or on behalf of any party
hereto*

Each warranty, representation and agreement

contained herein is independent of all other warranties,
representations and agreements contained herein (whether
or not covering an identical or related subject matter)
and must be independently and separately complied with and
satisfied.

No representation or warranty or agreement

made herein shall be limited in its construction by
reference to or from any others such provision.
17.

Further Assurances.

Seller, the Kattons

and Buyer shall execute from time to time any and all
further documents, instruments or agreements and do all
other things and deliver all items, which may be
reasonably necessary to effectuate and carry out any and
all of the provisions of this Agreement and the
transactions provided for herein.
18.

Risk of Loss.

All risk of loss relating

to the Assets shall remain solely with Seller until
Closing.
19.

Miscellaneous.
(a)

All notices, requests, demands and

other communications hereunder shall be in writing and
shall be deemed to have been duly given if delivered
-28-

personally against receipt or mailed, postage prepaid, by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
Seller and the Hattons at 4?>V AbO.VlJ> D&Ot-

£L(L

UTM/l^

and to Buyer at 361 Lavndale Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah
&i\\$~Ji41r£§>f or to such other address as any party hereto may
properly designate in writing in accordance herewith.
(b)

All of the terms of this Agreement

shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of, and
shall be enforceable by the heirs, executors,
administrators, successors, legal representatives and
assigns of Buyer, Seller and the Hattons.
(c)

All words shall be construed to be of

such gender and number as the circumstances require.
(d)

This Agreement constitutes the entire

agreement of the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and may not be revised, modified or waived
except in writing signed by all the parties hereto.
(e)

This Agreement shall be governed by the

laws of the State of Utah.
(f)

If any portion of this Agreement is

adjudged invalid, uneforceable or void, the remainder
shall remain in full force and effect.
(g)

No failure or delay of any party hereto

to exercise any right or remedy hereunder shall operate as
a waiver thereof.

A waiver on one occasion shall not be

construed as a waiver or as a bar to any right or remedy
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on any future occasion for that breach or default or any
subsequent breach or default,
(h)

If any of the Assets are subject to

taxes, assessments or similar charges not yet due and
payable, such taxes, assessments or similar charges shall
be prorated as of April 28, 1985, between Seller and Buyer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed
this Agreement as of the day first written above.

SELLER:

THE TRAVEL
COMPANY, INC.

BUYER:

WANDA HATTOfi/

0445N
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MORRIS TRAVEL
CORPORATION

EXHIBIT A
(attached to and forming a part of that certain
Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of
Assets between The Travel Company, Inc.,
Morris Travel Corporation, and William
and Wanda Hatton dated as of April 15, 1985)
Promissory Note
April 30, 1985

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Morris Travel Corporation, a
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ("Debtor") promises to pay to The Travel
Company, I n c . , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ("Payee") at
or at such other p l a c e
as Payee s h a l l have d e s i g n a t e d t o Debtor in w r i t i n g , the
p r i n c i p a l sum of $500,000, t o g e t h e r with i n t e r e s t on the
unpaid p r i n c i p a l balance c a l c u l a t e d at an annual r a t e
equal t o t h e l e s s e r of ten p e r c e n t (10%) per annum or the
"prime r a t e " per annum charged by F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank of
Utah, N.A. (the "Bank"), a d j u s t a b l e the day of any change.
("Prime r a t e " i s herein defined to be the lowest r a t e at
which t h e Bank makes loans to i t s commercial borrowers.)
P r i n c i p a l i n s t a l l m e n t s s h a l l be due and payable in accordance with the following s c h e d u l e :
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On

A p r i l 3 0 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
October 3 1 , 1986, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
January 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1987, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
October 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
January 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1988, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
October 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
January 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1989, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
October 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
January 3 1 , 1990, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1990, the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 .

Accrued i n t e r e s t s h a l l be due and payable at the time of
each p r i n c i p a l i n s t a l l m e n t payment d e s c r i b e d above.

The principal amount of this Note, and the payment schedule set forth above, are subject to possible
adjustment pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of that
certain Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Assets (the
"Agreement") dated as of April 15, 1985, between Debtor,
Payee, and William and Wanda Hatton. If such an adjustment is required, Debtor and Payee agree that Debtor shall
execute an amendment to this Note reflecting the revised
principal amount hereof and the revised payment schedule
as provided for in the Agreement.
In the event of any default in the payment of any
principal or interest due under this Note when due and
payable, and if such default is not cured within ten days
after written notice thereof to Debtor from Payee, then
the whole principal sum of this Note plus all accrued
interest shall, at the option of the holder of this Note,
become immediately due and payable without notice or
demand, and the holder of this Note shall have and may
exercise any and all of the rights and remedies provided
herein.
If Payee retains an attorney for collection of
this Note, or if any suit or proceeding is brought for the
recovery or protection of all or any part of the indebtedness evidenced by this Note, then Debtor agrees to pay on
demand all costs and expenses of the suit or proceeding or
any appeal thereof, incurred by Payee, including, without
limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees.
Debtor shall have the right to prepay this Note
in whole or in part at any time without penalty.
Debtor hereby waives presentment and notice of
dishonor, and assents to any extension of time with respect to any payment due under this Note. No waiver of
any payment or other right under this Note shall operate
as a waiver of any other payment or right.
This Note shall be governed by and construed
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.
MORRIS TRAVEL CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation

By:
President
0452K
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Promissory Note

April 30, 1985

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, M o r r i s T r a v e l C o r p o r a t i o n , a
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ( " D e b t o r " ) p r o m i s e s t o pay t o The T r a v e l
Company, I n c . , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ("Payee' 1 ) a t such p l a c e
a s Payee s h a l l have d e s i g n a t e d t o Debtor in w r i t i n g , t h e
p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 , t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t on t h e
u n p a i d p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e c a l c u l a t e d a t an annual r a t e
e q u a l t o t h e l e s s e r of t e n p e r c e n t (10%) p e r annum or t h e
" p r i m e r a t e " p e r annum c h a r g e d by F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank of
U t a h , N.A. ( t h e " B a n k " ) , on t h e f i r s t day of each q u a r t e r l y p e r i o d d e s c r i b e d in t h e s c h e d u l e of payments below.
( " P r i m e r a t e " i s h e r e i n d e f i n e d t o be t h e lowest r a t e a t
which t h e Bank makes l o a n s t o i t s commercial b o r r o w e r s . )
P r i n c i p a l i n s t a l l m e n t s s h a l l be due and p a y a b l e in
accordance with the following schedule:
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On

A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1986, Che p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1986, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 8 7 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1987, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 8 8 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1 9 8 8 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1988, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J u l y 3 1 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1989, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1990, t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ;
A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 9 0 , t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 .

Accrued interest shall be due and payable at the time of
each principal installment payment described above.
The principal amount of this Note, and the payment schedule set forth above, are subject to possible
adjustment pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of that
certain Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Assets (the
"Agreement") dated as of April 15, 1985, between Debtor,
Payee, and William and Wanda Hatton. If such an adjustment is required, Debtor and Payee agree that Debtor 2nd
Payee shall execute an amendment to this Note reflecting
the revised principal amount hereof and the revised payment schedule as provided for in the Agreement.

In the event of any default in the payment of any
principal or interest due under this Note when due and
payable, and if such default is not cured within ten days
after written notice thereof to Debtor from Payee, then
the whole principal sum of this Note plus all accrued
interest shall, at the option of the holder of this Note,
become immediately due and payable without notice or
demand, and the holder of this Note shall have and may
exercise any and all of the rights and remedies provided
herein.
If Payee retains an attorney for collection of
this Note, or if any suit or proceeding is brought for the
recovery or protection of all or any part of the indebtedness evidenced by this Note, then Debtor agrees to pay on
demand all costs and expenses of the suit or proceeding or
any appeal thereof, incurred by Payee, including, without
limitation, reasonable attorneys1 fees.
Debtor shall have the right to prepay this Note
in whole or in part at any time without penalty.
The payment of this Note is guaranteed, in part,
under Guaranty Agreements of even date herewith executed
by Randall A. Hunt, Mark G. Slack, Richard W. Frendt and
Kaye H. Burgon.
Debtor hereby waives presentment and notice of
dishonor,, and assents to any extension of time with respect to any payment due under this Note. Nonwaiver of
any payment or other right under this Note shall operate
as a waiver of any other payment or right.
This Note shall be governed by and construed
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.
MORRIS TRAVEL CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation

By: v ^ % ^ ^ >
President
0466K
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